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NOTE
The Copyrightability of Object Code
If the process were stopped at any one stage, would the [com-
puter] program as it existed at that point be entitled to legal pro-
tection? This question, as the extensive literature proves, is a
profound and troubling one, embracing not merely science and
law, but philosophy as well.'
Recognizing the importance of the computer to American soci-
ety, Time conferred its prestigious "Man of the Year" award on the
computer in 1983, dubbing it "Machine of the Year."' 2 The
"Machine of the Year" is useless, however, without a computer pro-
gram,3 and meaningful legal protection for a computer program is
not yet guaranteed.
Legal protection for computer programs includes three different
types of protection: patent, trade secret, and copyright. Commenta-
tors have acclaimed each as the best method of legal protection.
4
This note examines copyright protection and focuses on object code
5
to determine if copyright offers meaningful legal protection for com-
puter programs. As the quotation above suggests, an analysis of legal
protection for computer programs involves three disciplines: sci-
ence,6 law, and philosophy.
1 Gemignani, Legal Protection for Computer Software: The View from '79, 7 RUTGERS J.
COMP.,.TECH. & LAW 273 (1980).
2 Machine of the Year, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 14.
3 See text accompanying notes 6-21 infia.
4 For an article in favor of patent protection, see Bender, Computer Programs: Should They
be Patentable?, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 241, 248 (1968)("Although there are methods of protection
other than patent laws, none of these methods meets as well as patent protection the needs of
the computer industry."). For an article in favor of trade secret protection, see Nimtz, Devel-
opment of the Law of Computer Software Protection, 61 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 3, 25 (1979) ("[I]t is
more likely that some form of trade secret protection will survive. This form of protection is
currently the most widely used, the most reliable and ... the residual form of protection
when all other forms are either in doubt or fail."). For an article in favor of copyright protec-
tion, see Root, Protecting Computer Software in the '80s.- Practical Guidelinesfor Evolving Needs, 8
RUTGERS COMP. &TECH. LJ. 205 (1981) ("[T]he combined evolution of the software market
and copyright law has made copyright the preferred means of protection for software.").
5 See text accompanying notes 10-12 infra.
6 See generaly in order of relevance, N. CHAPIN, COMPUTERS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
(1971); T.M. WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER SCIENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH (1972); J.A. O'BRIEN, COMPUTERS IN BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (3d ed. 1982); W.
R. CORLISS, COMPUTERS (1973); J.A.N. LEE, THE ANATOMY OF A COMPILER (2d ed. 1974).
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I. Scientific Background
A computer is a problem-solving machine that has three basic
parts: (1) an input/output system, (2) a central processing unit
(CPU), and (3) a main storage. As their names indicate, the in-
put/output system inserts and transfers information in to and out of
a computer, the central processing unit controls the translation and
execution of instructions, and the main storage stores information for
retrieval later. These three parts are referred to as "hardware."
Computer hardware by itself, however, cannot solve any problems.
A computer requires a program to solve problems; these programs
are referred to as "software."
A computer program is "a set of statements or instructions to be
used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result."' 7 Computer programs fall into two general categories:
programs that supervise the CPU (called systems software) and pro-
grams that supervise solving particular problems (called application
software). Regardless of which category the program falls into, the
program is the end result of a two-part process involving: (A) devel-
oping an algorithm; and (B) translating the algorithm into either a
computer language or machine language program.
A. Algorithm Development
Before a computer can be used to solve a particular problem, a
programmer must determine the method for solving the problem.
This method for solving the problem is known as an "algorithm."
For example, if the problem is: "How do I get a date for Saturday
night?," then the algorithm for one possible solution would be:
1. List all the available members of the opposite sex I know.
2. Order them according to my desire to date them.
3. Contact the highest ranked.
4. Ask for a date on Saturday night.
5. If the first declines, then ask the second.
6. Repeat until someone accepts or the list is finished.
7. If someone accepts, then I have my date.
So, an algorithm is simply a universal, detailed sequence for solving a
particular problem. Another example of an algorithm, using a prob-
lem more appropriate for a computer, i.e., "what is the value for x4 +
2," is:
7 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980). The 1980 Amendment
added this computer program definition.
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1. get x
2. multiply x by itself
3. multiply the value in (2) by x
4. multiply the value in (3) by x
5. add 1 to the value in (4)
6. add 1 to the value in (5).
Algorithms of the type presented above (English-language rep-
resentation) are only the first step in developing a method for solving
a problem. For more complex algorithms, the English language be-
comes an unsatisfactory means of representing the method for solving
the problem. For example, the repetitious process called for in steps
(5) and (6) of the first algorithm and steps (2) through (6) of the
second algorithm can be better represented graphically.
Therefore, the second step in developing a method for solving a
problem is to replace the English-language representation of the al-
gorithm with a "flow-chart" representation of the algorithm. The
flow chart representing the "Saturday date" algorithm is given in
Figure 1, p. 415. The flow chart for the "x 4 + 2" algorithm is given
in Figure 2, p. 416.
After programmers have determined a method of solution for a
particular problem, they can then use a computer to solve the prob-
lem, provided they can make the computer execute the steps in the
flow chart. To do this the flow chart, or the algorithm, must be
translated into a program the machine can execute.
B. Translation
Before discussing how a computer executes the steps in a flow
chart, it is necessary to understand how the machine stores data. A
computer can only represent data by either the presence or absence
of a "signal" at a certain point within the machine." Because the
computer can only represent information through the presence or ab-
sence of a signal, it operates on a binary system. The physical repre-
sentation of the presence or absence of a signal is translated into a
two digit number system, where 0 and 1 represent the presence or
absence of a signal. By grouping the O's and l's together into a
number sequence (and necessarily, therefore, grouping the signals to-
gether within the machine), a code is created which can represent all
Arabic numerals and all letters of the English language. The code
represents both data and instructions for the machine. This code, the
8 The signal can take the form of open or closed switches in the machine or the presence
or the absence of an electrical charge on a magnetic disk.
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FIGURE 1. Flow chart representation for the "Saturday date" algorithm.
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FIGURE 2. Flow chart representation for the "x
4 + 2" algorithm.
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object code, also defines the exact location within the computer's cir-
cuitry of the signals which the code represents. The object code, con-
sisting of nothing but O's and l's, is also referred to as machine
language. Each computer has a unique machine language because
each has a unique set of locations for the signals which represent each
data item and each instruction.9
Returning to the problem of getting the computer to execute the
steps in our flow chart, we can now discuss computer programming.
Programming is the process of converting a flow chart representation
of an algorithm into steps in a computer programming language or a
machine language.
Computer programming languages such as BASIC, FOR-
TRAN, and COBOL, are referred to as "high-level languages" be-
cause they more closely resemble English. In fact, BASIC has been
called an English dialect. 10 Machine languages are referred to as
"low-level languages." An example of FORTRAN is "X**4 + 2,"
which is the computer programming language expression for the flow
chart in Figure 2. Note how simple this representation is, while the
flow chart is complex. These high-level languages, referred to as
source codes, are just shorthand codes for more complex steps. Pri-
marily because programming in machine language is "slow, difficult,
and error-prone,"'1 programming is done in computer programming
languages.
Ultimately, for the computer to execute the FORTRAN pro-
gram, it must translate the high-level computer programming lan-
guage (source code) into low-level machine language (object code).
A compiler program translates source code into object code. The
compiler program is stored in the computer's main storage and con-
trolled by the CPU.
In summary, the entire translation from source code to execu-
tion takes place as follows:
1. Source code is inputed into the computer.
9 Each non-similary designed computer has a unique set of locations. All Apple II's, for
example, have the same machine language since they are of similar design.
10 Stem, Another Look at Copyrzght Prolection of Software: Did the 1980 Act Do Anything for
Object Code?, 3 COMPUTER LJ. 1, 2 (1981).
11 There are six reasons for a programmer to choose source code over object code when
writing a program: (1) speed; (2) ease of debugging; (3) inefficiency of the object language,
i.e., inexperienced programmers will be less efficient than a compiler program (that program
which translates source code into object code) if they write directly in object code; (4) efficient
use of storage, i.e., again inexperienced programmers will be less efficient than a compiler
program if they write directly in object code; (5) easier documentation; and (6) ease of learn-
ing. See CHAPIN, supra note 6, at 348-350.
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2. The CPU copies the source code and places it in the com-
puter's memory.
3. The CPU's control unit removes the compiler program from
memory and places it in the working unit.
4. The control unit takes the source code from memory and
gives it to the compiler program as data.
5. The compiler translates the source code into object code.
6. The object code then controls the execution of the problem.
In a variation on this one time translation process, object code can be
etched on chips called "Read Only Memory" (ROM) 12 and perma-
nentl.y stored within the computer as a physical component.
In summary, computer programs direct a computer how to solve
a problem. A programmer usually writes the program in source
code, which is then translated into object code. The object code then
directs the computer's execution of the steps in the program until a
problem's solution is reached.
II. State of the Law
A. Source Code versus Object Code
As the technical information above explains, a computer pro-
gram has two phases: source code and object code. Courts generally
consider source code to be copyrightable, 13 which is not surprising.
Source code is clearly a writing "written by a human author exercis-
ing the usual skills of human authorship, i.e., the selection of a partic-
ular mode of expression in a generally accepted language and using
rules of syntax and grammar which insure intelligibility." 
14
To establish legal protection for the source code through copy-
right one must:
15
1. Place a copyright notice at many places within the program
and on the disk that contains the program.16
2. Fill out Copyright Office Form TX.
12 ROM's are semiconducting silicon chips that by their very construction have object
code encoded into them. They are a permanent piece placed within the computer and have a
fixed memory that is not changeable.
13 The state of the law is fairly clear regarding the copyrightability of source code. As
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania said in Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 822 n.15 (E.D. Penn. 1982), rev'don
other grounds, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983): "Programs written in source codes are generally
conceded to be copyrightable."
14 Nimtz, Computer Programs, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT LAw 1982, 143
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SE-
RIES, 141, 148 (PLI) (1982).
15 D. REMER, LEGAL CARE FOR YOUR SOFTWARE 26-34 (1982).
16 An example of a sufficient notice is: (c) 1984 James Canfield.
[1984]
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3. File Form TX with the Copyright Office along with the filing
fee and a copy of the source code.
17
After fulfilling these three steps, the source code has full copyright
protection, and the copyright holder can sue another who uses the
program without permission.' 8 If the copyright holder proves in-
fringement, then a court can award damages' 9 or issue an injunction
to stop the unauthorized use.20 However, full copyright protection
for source code does not fully protect the computer program from use
by another.
To fully protect a computer program from use by another, both
source and object code must be protected. Copyrighting the source
code alone is insufficient because a dedicated programming expert
can deduce the underlying object code from a copy of the source
code. If the object code is not also protected, then the expert can use
the deduced object code to run a computer. Similarly, if the object
code in the form of an ROM is not protected, then, since an expert
can examine the physical construction of the ROM with a micro-
scope and "read" the object code etched therein, the computer pro-
gram can be copied.
Consequently, one company can invest millions of dollars devel-
oping and translating algorithms into marketable, copyrightable
source code,2' yet another company can duplicate the first company's
program by deducing, at a cost in only the thousands of dollars, the
object code from either the copyrighted source code or the ROM.
Therefore, while the source code is copyrightable, unless the object
code is also protected, copyright protection for computer programs is
practically useless.
B. Uncertainty over Object Code
A court first considered whether object code is copyrightable in
Data Cash Systemu, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc. 22 In Data Cash the plaintiff
17 A copy of the source code is the first and last twenty-five pages of the program. If one
files object code, the Copyright Office will accept the registration under the "rule of doubt,"
meaning that the Copyright Office will accept it, but they cannot determine if it is really
copyrightable. See REMER, supra note 15, at 34.
18 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1976).
19 The copyright holder can recover the amount lost due to the infringement or the prof-
its made by the infringers. The court can award statutory damages, from $100-$50,000, even
if one cannot prove that the infringers made a profit. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1976). One can also
recover court costs and, at the court's discretion, attorney's fees. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976).
20 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1976).
21 See Computer Rights Stir Legal Snarl, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
22 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979), affdon other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
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copyrighted a computer program, in source code, for use in a
handheld computerized chess game. The manufacturer encrypted
the program, in object code, into an ROM and then placed it in the
game. The defendants produced a handheld chess game of their own
containing an ROM they constructed after "reading" the plaintiff's
ROM.
Both parties assumed the plaintiff's ROM was a "copy" of the
plaintiff's copyrighted computer program for the game. However,
the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, saying:
"While the ROM is the mechanical embodiment of the source pro-
gram, it is not a 'copy' of it.
''
23
The court found that an ROM was not a "copy" of the source
code under both the common law and the 1909 Copyright Act. To
support their common law view, the court analogized to cases hold-
ing that a building is not a copy of the architectural plans upon
which the building is based. Since only similar technical writings
can be "copies" of architectural plans, the court said that at common
law a "copy" of a computer program can only be another computer
program in itsflow chart or source phase since these are "comparable
technical writings."
24
To support their view that the ROM is not a "copy" of the
source code under the 1909 Copyright Act, the court cited White-
Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. 25 In White-Smith, the Supreme
Court held that a piano roll was not a "copy" of the musical compo-
sition recorded thereon since "[i]n no sense can musical sounds which
reach us through the sense of hearing be said to be copies as that
term is generally understood. '26 Analogizing to White-Smith, the Data
Cash court found that since one cannot see and read an ROM with
the naked eye, it is not a copy under the 1909 Act.2 7 The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed Data Cash's result28 but did
not consider the district court's position that an ROM is not a copy
of the source code since neither side had contested the issue on
appeal.2
9
In Tandy Corp. V. Personal Micro Computers, Inc. ,o the court took a
23 480 F. Supp. at 1068.
24 Id.
25 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
26 Id. at 17.
27 480 F. Supp. at 1069.
28 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
29 Id. at 1041.
30 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
[1984]
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position on the issue opposite to the Data Cash position. The plaintiff
in Tandy Corp. had a home computer with an ROM that controlled
the computer's translation of input data from high-level language to
low-level machine language. The plaintiff claimed that the defen-
dant had copied plaintiffs translation program. The defendant ar-
gued that the plaintiff's ROM chips were not copies of the original
computer program and, therefore, defendant's ROM chips, which
were copies of plaintiffs ROM chips, did not infringe the copyright
covering the original program.
The court found for the plaintiff, holding that a computer
program fixed in the form of an ROM is a "copy" of the original
copyrighted program and therefore protected by the copyright laws.
The court cited 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) which states that works can be
fixed in "any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device." The court said that imprinting a computer program into a
silicon chip easily fell within this definition.
3 1
In GCA Corp. v. Chance32 the court followed Tandy Corp. and re-
jected Data Cash. In GCA Corp., the plaintiff copyrighted its source
code, but not its object code, for certain computer programs. The
defendant contended that copyrighting only the source code does not
protect the object code. The court said that because the object code
encrypts the copyrighted source code, the two should be treated as
one. Therefore, according to the court, the copyright of the source
code protects both.
33
In several cases dealing with video games the courts also fol-
lowed the Tand Corp. decision 4 For example, in Williams Electronics,
31 Id. at 173.
32 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
33 Id. at 720.
34 In Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic International, Inc. 547 F. Supp. 999, 1008 (N.D. Ill.
1982), the district court said: "[T]he copyrighted material is recorded in the ROMs and may
be reproduced with the aid of the microprocessor. While the technology of the reproduction
is different than that encountered with videotape, Congress has allowed for that eventuality
by allowing for fixation in mediums of expression either 'now known or later developed'."
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 704 F.2d 1009, 1012 (1983), conclud-
ing that video games are copyrightable as audiovisual works. See also Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 746 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (The defendant does not dispute the "now
well established" proposition that a video game's images and sounds qualify for copyright
protection as an audiovisual work.); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466,
480 (D. Neb. 1981) ("[I]t is clear that the plaintiffs audiovisual works are fixed in the printed
circuit boards.').
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Inc. v. Artic International, Inc. ,35 the defendant copied, and sold in its
own kits, the computer program for the video game DEFENDER.
When sued for infringement, the defendant relied upon the Data
Cash district court opinion. The court found for the plaintiff, saying
that to allow duplication of a copyrighted computer program etched
on a silicon chip would create an "unlimited loophole" for copyright
infringement.
36
Therefore, despite an initial finding in Data Cash that the object
code is not a "copy" of the source code and not protected under the
copyright laws, subsequent decisions rejected Data Cash and asserted
that the object code is indeed a "copy" of the source code and is
protected by the copyright laws. These decisions asserting that the
object code is a "copy" of the source code are the better reasoned.
Object code, when not initially written as object code, is simply the
machine-translated version of source code. Admittedly, most people
would find the translation unintelligible. But, a book translated into
braille is no less a "copy" because it is translated into a form that is
unintelligible to most people.
A more disturbing problem arises, however, in calling object
code a copyrightable "copy" of the source code, because the Copyright
Act requires "communication" and "expression" and object code is
not always directed at a human audience. A court first confronted
this problem in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. (Franklin
J).37
In Franklin I, the plaintiff sued for a preliminary injunction re-
straining the defendant from infringing on the plaintiff's copyrights
on fourteen computer programs written in object code. The copy-
right holder sued after the defendant built a personal computer that
could run all of the plaintiff's programs. The court concluded "that
there is some doubt as to the copyrightability of the programs.138
Accordingly, the court denied the motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion since the plaintiff was unable to show a reasonable probability of
success on the merits.
By focusing on the "audience" for a computer program, the
Franklin I court confronted a problem that earlier cases ignored, i.e.,
whether the program in its object code phase always comes within
the scope of the Copyright Act. The Copyright Act protects only
35 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
36 Id. at 877.
37 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Penn. 1982), reu'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (Franklin I1).
38 545 F. Supp. at 812.
[1984]
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"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device" 39 (emphasis supplied). The Copyright Act,
therefore, essentially sets two requirements for a work to receive
copyright protection: authorship and expression. One must remem-
ber, however, that Congress exercised a constitutional grant of power
in the Copyright Act. The Constitution gives Congress the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors. . .the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings." 4° Currently, Congress has not fully exercised this consti-
tutional grant of power.41 Any exercise of this power, however, must
come within the scope of the general grant of power. Therefore, the
philosophical questions "Who is an 'author'?" and "What is a 'writ-
ing'?" underlie any discussion of copyright protection.
III. Philosophy
A. Who Is An Author?
The United States Supreme Court has defined an author as "he
to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker. ' 42 A program-
mer writing a program in source code easily fits this definition, but
object code, when translated from source code by a compiler pro-
39 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
41 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) quoted in Kernochan, Subject
Matter of Coyrzght; Rights in General; Rights in Relation to Computers, in CURRENT DEVELOP-
MENTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 1977, 81 PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND LITERARY
PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 49 (PLI) (1977). The report states:
In using the phrase 'original works of authorship,' rather than 'all the writings
of an author' now in section 4 of the statute, the committee's purpose is to avoid
exhausting the constitutional power of Congress to legislate in this field, and to elim-
inate the uncertainties arising from the latter phrase. Since the present statutory
language is substantially the same as the empowering language of the Constitution,
a recurring question has been whether the statutory and the constitutional provi-
sions are co-extensive. If so, the courts would be faced with the alternative of hold-
ing copyrightable something that Congress clearly did not intend to protect, or of
holding constitutionally incapable of copyright something that Congress might one
day want to protect. To avoid these equally undesirable results, the courts have
indicated that 'all the writings of an author' under the present statute is narrower in
scope than the 'writing' of 'authors' referred to in the Constitution. The bill avoids
this dilemma by using a different phrase--'original works of authorship'--in charac-
terizing the general subject matter of statutory copyright protection.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51.
42 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
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gram,43 appears authorless. A plaintiff can convincingly argue, how-
ever, that the compiler's translation of source into object code occurs
on a predictable one-to-one basis and therefore preserves the
programmer's authorship.
44
Object code encrypted into an ROM presents a greater problem
since it appears to have been "built" rather than "authored." In
Franklin I, the court correctly suggested that an encoded ROM might
be more aptly described as a "pictorial three-dimensional object"
rather than as a "literary work," thereby discounting the authorship
concept normally associated with literary works.45 This, however,
would not mean that the ROM is not copyrightable because three
dimensional works of art are entitled to copyright protection.
46
B. What Is A Writing?
In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony 47 the Supreme Court
defined writing as "the literary productions of. . .authors . . . in-
clud[ing] all forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, &c., by
which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expres-
sion."'48 In a later case the Supreme Court, in dicta, extended this
definition to include "any physical rendering of the fruits of creative
intellectual or aesthetic labor." 49 Certainly, both source code and
object code fit this later definition of "writing." However, not every-
one accepts this broad definition of "writing." Two more restrictive
tests for what constitutes a writing are the court's in Franklin I and
Professor Nimmer's. Of the two, the Franklin I test is stricter.
In his treatise on copyright, Professor Nimmer states: "If a work
contains a modicum of intellectual labor, and is embodied in tangi-
ble form, it would seem that it may constitute a writing if it is per-
ceptive to any of the five senses." 50 Since source code can easily be
read, it easily passes Nimmer's test. Arguably, object code also passes
Nimmer's test since it can be read, although only by experts familiar
with the binary code. The fact that meaningless code words have
43 Of course, if the program is written directly in object code by the programmer, then
object code would have been authored.
44 545 F. Supp. at 822.
45 Id. In Franklin II, 714 F.2d at 1249, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit as-
serted that a computer program in object code is a "literary work." The Franklin II court,
however, erred in not considering whether a "literary work" requires a human audience.
46 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B] (1982).
47 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
48 Id. at 58.
49 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
50 1 NIMMER, supra note 46, at § 1.08[B] (footnotes omitted).
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been afforded copyright protection supports Nimmer's position. 5 1
The court in Franklin 1, however, proposed a stricter test, requir-
ing that whatever the form of expression or the medium used, the
question must be whether the exlression is directed to a human audi-
ence.5 2 While source code and meaningless code words might fit this
test, object code may not. Although a trained programmer may be
able to read object code, it is usually directed solely to a machine.
Object code and computer hardware interaction (executed ob-
ject code), however, can result in a perceivable output directed at a
human audience (e.g., video games and print-outs). One commenta-
tor has argued, though, that since the programmer normally wants to
protect the unexecuted object code, this code, not its output, must
qualify as a writing.5 3 This argument, however, simplifies the prob-
lem too much. If the program's output is irrelevant, then object code
would certainly be copyrightable. Essentially, unexecuted object
code is no different from "unexecuted" magnetic tape in a cassette.
Yet the tape is copyrightable because it can be perceived, albeit with
the aid of a machine. Object code creates doubt as to its
copyrightability precisely because even when executed it may not be
perceivable by a human audience.
The Franklin I court drew this distinction between object code
that creates a perceivable output and object code that creates an un-
perceivable output. The court stated:
If the concept of "language" means anything, it means an ability
to create human interaction. It is the fixed expression of this that
the copyright law protects, and only this. To go beyond the
bounds of this protection would be ultimately to provide copy-
right protection to the programs created by a computer to run
other computers. With that, we step into the world of Gulliver
where horses are "human" because they speak a language that
sounds remarkably like the one humans use.
54
The Franklin I court, therefore, supported copyright protection for
video game programs in the object code phase. The court stated that
a video game program's purpose was to generate a perceivable image
and to thereby attract a human audience and that such a purpose
and goal satisfied "conventional expectations of expression." 55
A Congressional commission confronted the issue of whether ob-
51 Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
52 545 F. Supp. at 824.
53 D. BROOKS, COMPUTER PROGRAMS & DATA BASES, 134 n.6 (1981).
54 545 F. Supp. at 825.
55 Id.
NOTE[Vol. 59:412] 425
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ject code is a "writing" and, therefore, acceptable material for copy-
right protection long before the issue was ever litigated. In 1974,
Congress created the Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to study the use of copyrighted works
in conjunction with computers. The commission members split
eleven to three in favor of object code being considered a "writing."
The commission, however, did not consider the problem of object
code encrypted into an ROM.56 The majority said:
Because [programs] are used in conjunction with machines there
has not been universal agreement about the propriety of copy-
right protection. Programs should no more be considered parts
of machines than videotapes should be considered parts of projec-
tors or phonorecords parts of sound reproduction equipment. All
three types of works are capable of communicating with
humans .... -57
In a concurrence, Commissioner Nimmer recommended limit-
ing copyright protection for object code to only those programs
whose output would qualify for copyright protection. Nimmer said:
A program designed for a computer game would be copyright-
able because the output would itself constitute an audiovisual
work. On the other hand, programs which control the heating
and air-conditioning in a building, or which determine the flow
of fuel in an engine, or which control traffic signals would not be
eligible for copyright because their operations do not result in
copyrightable works .... 58
Commissioner Hersey dissented, arguing that object code should not
be considered a "writing" since it only communicates with the
machine.
59
The CONTU majority, therefore, reached a different conclusion
from the Franklin I court concerning the copyrightability of object
code. CONTU asserted that object code is a "writing" and within
56 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT 79 (1978). Because CONTU did not consider ROM's, one might argue that
the CONTU report is irrelevant in the context of litigation involving ROM's. CONTU is
relevant, however, because CONTU confronted the underlying issues, as is apparent in the
opinions of the majority, Commissioner Nimmer, and Commissioner Hersey. Whether
CONTU is relevant as legislative history is a separate question discussed in the text accompa-
nying notes 72-74 infra.
57 Id. at 52.
58 Id. at 27.
59 Commissioner Hersey said: "[T]he direct product of a computer program is a series of
electronic impulses which operate a computer; the 'writing' of the author is spent in the labor




the scope of copyright protection, while the Franklin I court asserted
that object code is within the scope of copyright protection ony if the
expression is directed at a human audience.
Since Franklin I, three courts have confronted the copyrightabili-
ty of object code outside the video game context. In Hubco Data Prod-
ucts Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc. ,60 Management Assistance Inc.
(MAI) alleged that Hubco modified computer operating systems and
sold software that infringed MAI's operating system's object code.
Hubco contended that object code is not eligible for copyright pro-
tection because it is a machine process that is not communicated to
others.61 The court conceded that Franklin I provided authority for
Hubco's position but noted that the CONTU report and Williams
62
provided authority against Hubco. The court termed Williams and
the CONTU report "well reasoned" 63 and, following their lead,
found that Hubco had infringed on MAI's programs.
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc. ,64 Apple sued
Formula for copyright infringement. Formula sold a personal com-
puter, Pineapple, that Apple alleged contained ROM's which were
virtually identical copies of Apple's ROM's. Formula had conceded
that some computer programs are validly copyrightable. 65 There-
fore, the primary issue was whether all computer programs including
ROM's are copyrightable. Basing its decision upon the CONTU re-
port and public policy, 66 the Formula court rejected Formula's dis-
60 1983 COPYRIGHT LAW REPORTER (CCH) 25,529.
61 As stated in Hubco's memorandum, quoted by the court:
These operating system programs are never intended to be "perceived" by the recip-
ient. In their function, they are transparent; they are not visible. In operation, they
become an integral part of the machine. They control procedures and process.
They establish the limits of the system, the method of operation. But, in and of
themselves, these operating system programs are invisible. The user never preceives
(sic), or views these codes; the user is aware only of their result in the functioning of
his machine.
Id at 18,105.
62 See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
63 1983 COPYRIGHT LAw REPORTER (CCH) at 18,105.
64 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
65 Formula conceded:
Some computer programs are validly copyrightable, i.e., those which contain ex-
pression. (Those which are not copyrightable, say Defendants, are those integral to
the operation of the machine which do not directly produce visual communication
with the user of the machine. All five items in issue are of the latter
type.)(parenthetical comment by the court).
Id at 779.
66 During its discussion of public policy, the Formula court said that it is up to Congress to
determine if copyright, or a new form of protection, is best for the new technology. Id at 783.
An example of Congress at work in this area is the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
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tinction between computer programs that directly produce visual
communication with the user and those that do not.
The Formula court also distinguished and questioned Franklin I.
While Franklin I and Formula may be distinguishable, the court erred
in questioning Franklin's validity simply because of Williams. As
stated earlier, Williams involves a video game ROM. Williams, and
all other video game cases, should be considered separately because
the ROM's involved produce a visual output directed at a human
audience. To cite as authority the holding from a video game case in
a case involving a ROM with no such visual output inherently begs
the question because these cases involve different programs. Even if
the court does not decide the issue on the basis of "audiovisual
work, '67 a video game ROM does produce a perceivable output and,
therefore, does not present the difficult question of the
copyrightability of ROM's that produce unperceivable output.
In Franklin fJ,68 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
versed Franklin I, finding (1) no distinction between source code and
object code and (2) that computer programs embedded on an ROM
satisfy the Copyright Act's fixation requirements. The Franklin II
court cites Williams as authority for both holdings. While it was cor-
rect for the court to cite Williams and other video game cases as au-
thority for the proposition that ROM's satisfy the fixation
requirements (as three of Franklin II's four cases cited on this point
are), it was a mistake for the court, just as it was a mistake for the
Formula court, to cite Williams as authority for finding no distinction
between source code and object code. Worse, the court of appeals in
1983 which has been proposed in both houses. Regarding S. 1201, the Senate version of the
bill, see 26 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 33, 46, (1983) and 27 PAT. TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) 72, 97 (1983) (bill was marked-up and referred out of commit-
tee); and regarding H.R. 1028, the House version of the bill, see 25 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 333, 341 (1983). The Act is designed to stop "chip piracy" by ex-
tending, for ten years, copyright protection to the imprinted design patterns on the chips.
Certainly, semiconductor chips affect our lives. As Senator Mathias stated:
The chip is in the home, making dinner in the microwave oven, setting the thermo-
stat and tuning the radio; it is in the supermarket, adding up our purchases; it is in
the car, controlling fuel consumption; it is in the hospital, helping doctors diagnose
disease; it is in the schools, instructing our children; and it is in the office, doing the
typing, the recordkeeping, and almost everything else.
26 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 46 (1983). Yet, there is not universal agree-
ment that copyright protection is appropriate for chips. As the counsel to the United States
Copyright Office indicates, the relationship between the copyright in the chips and the copy-
right in the works of authorship embodied in the chips is unclear. 26 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 96 (1983).
67 See Sirohon, 564 F. Supp. at 746.
68 Frankin I, 714 F.2d at 1240.
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Franklin II found Williams dispositive.69
The Third Circuit court's misunderstanding of the Williams-
Franklin difference is apparent from the court's statement:
The defendant in Williams had also argued that a copyright-
able work 'must be intelligible to human beings and must be in-
tended as a medium of communication to human beings,' ...
We reiterate the statement we made in Williams when we re-
jected that argument: '[t]he answer to defendant's contention is
in the words of the statute itself.'
70
Examining the "words of the statute itself," though, leaves no doubt
that the court's concern in Franklin 1, that copyrightabilty be based
upon perception, still remains. The "words of the statute itself," as
given in Williams in the sentence following the one quoted by Franklin
I, are: "A 'copy' is defined to include a material object in which a
work is fixed 'by any method now known or later developed, andfrom
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.' " (emphasis
added in Williams).71 But, if a work does not have a human audi-
ence, how can it ever be communicated? Certainly, perception by
non-humans or mere reproducibility cannot be the basis for
copyrightability.
The Franklin II court's strongest argument that the computer
program's audience is irrelevant with regard to the copyright of ob-
ject code is that the CONTU report is the law.72 In 1980, Congress
enacted two changes in the Copyright Act that CONTU had recom-
mended. These changes added a new section 11773 and a new part to
section 101. 7 4 The Franklin II court's implicit argument that Con-
gress also intended to accept the CONTU majority's position regard-
ing the copyrightability of object code, i.e., that object code is
69 The Franklin II court said:
Certain statements by the district court suggest that programs expressed in ob-
ject code, as distinguished from source code, may not be the proper subject of copy-
right. We find no basis in the statute for any such concern. Furthermore, our
decision in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc. . . . laid to rest many of
the doubts expressed by the district court.
Id. at 1246-47.
70 Id. at 1248.
71 Williams, 685 F.2d at 877.
72 Franklin II, 714 F.2d at 1247-48.
73 The new § 117 concerns limitations on an owner's exclusive rights in computer pro-
grams. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1980).
74 The 1980 amendment adds the following definition of a computer program: "A 'com-
puter program' is a set of statements to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), amendedby 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980).
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copyrightable without regard to its audience, is strained. If the term
"expression" in section 102 of the Copyright Act is not going to re-
quire perceptibility, then a clearer indication of Congressional intent
then the 1980 changes in section 117 and section 101 is necessary.
IV. Conclusion
Whether object code can ever be copyrighted depends upon
whether object code has an "author" and is a "writing" within the
meaning of the copyright clause of the Constitution. Given the
broad interpretation of these words by the Supreme Court, it is likely
that object code, in any phase, can be copyrighted.
Whether object code is currently copyrightable depends upon
whether object code is a "work of authorship" and is an "expression"
within the meaning of section 102 of the Copyright Act. Since object
code fits within the definition of a "work of authorship," only "ex-
pression" presents a problem. If expression requires human percepti-
bility, which it seems it should, then object code will only be
copyrightable if the computer's output is perceptible to one of the
five senses. If one is willing to broadly construe "perceptible," then
object code is copyrightable. For example, one sees the pages of a
book, one tastes and smells a roast cooked in a microwave, one hears
a radio with "computerized" tuning, and one feels comfortable in a
building with controlled temperature.
Admittedly, perceivable results are not necessarily the direct
output of a computer program, but perceivable interaction with
human life is the goal desired. Although the machine creates the
perceivable results, copyright protection should extend to the pro-
gram, in source code, object code, or ROM, that causes the machine
to create perceivable results, because behind every program there is
an author at work, reaching an audience on a scale never before pos-
sible.
James Canfteld*
* An earlier version of this note was entered in the 1983 Nathan Burkan Memorial Com-
petition (ASCAP).
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